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Abstract: 
The budget constraint requires that, eventually, consumption must adjust fully to any permanent 
shock to income. Intuition suggests that, knowing this, optimizing agents will fully adjust their 
spending immediately upon experiencing a permanent shock. However, this paper shows that if 
consumers are impatient and are subject to transitory as well as permanent shocks, the optimal 
marginal propensity to consume out of permanent shocks (the MPCP) is strictly less than 1, 
because buffer stock savers have a target wealth-to-permanent-income ratio; a positive shock to 
permanent income moves the ratio below its target, temporarily boosting saving. 
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 1 Introduction
Arguably the core idea of Friedman (1957)’s Permanent Income Hypothesis is that an
optimizing consumer’s response to an income shock should be much larger if that shock
is permanent than if it is transitory.
A large empirical literature has shown that household income dynamics are reasonably
well characterized by the Friedman (1957)-Muth (1960) dichotomy between permanent
and transitory shocks.
1 And much of the subsequent theoretical literature can be
interpreted as construction of the theoretical foundations for evaluating Friedman’s
proposition under plausible assumptions about income dynamics, utility functions, and
expectations.
The hardest part of the theoretical enterprise has been incorporation of a rigorous
treatment of labor income uncertainty. Indeed, full understanding of the theoretical ef-
fects of such uncertainty on the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of transitory
shocks is relatively recent: Kimball (1990a,b) showed that under standard assumptions
about utility and expectations, the introduction of uncertainty in noncapital income
increases the MPC at a given level of consumption, but not necessarily at a given level
of wealth; and Carroll and Kimball (1996) show that the introduction of uncertainty
causes the MPC to rise at any given level of wealth, and to increase more for consumers
at lower levels of wealth.
2
Surprisingly, no previous paper has systematically analyzed the complementary ques-
tion of how uncertainty aﬀects the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent
shocks (the ‘MPCP’),
3 though the quesion is important not only as a loose end in
consumption theory, but also for microeconomic analysis of inequality (in both con-
sumption and income) and for both micro- and macroeconomic analysis of tax policies
and business cycles. Indeed, the topic can occasionally become headline news: The 2001
U.S. income tax cut was promoted by some economists as providing economic ‘stimulus’
on the explicit grounds that it was a permanent tax cut and therefore would have an
immediate one-for-one eﬀect on consumption.
4
The lack of a formal treatment probably reﬂects a sense among researchers that they
already know the answer: The MPCP should equal one. Because it is impossible to
permanently insulate consumption from a permanent shock, if consumption does not
adjust immediately and fully to such a shock, it will eventually need to adjust more than
one-for-one to make up for any initial period of less-than-full adjustment. Consumption-
smoothers, the thinking goes, will prefer to adjust fully now rather than less-than-fully
now and more-than-fully later.
1See, e.g., MaCurdy (1982); Abowd and Card (1989); Carroll and Samwick (1997); Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000);
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004); Blundell, Low, and Preston (2008).
2This result is a direct implication of the concavity of the consumption function that Carroll and Kimball (1996)
prove.
3By ‘permanent shocks’ here I mean shocks to noncapital income; the terms permanent income and permanent
noncapital income are used interchangably in this paper, except where doing so might cause confusion because of the
ambiguity the term ‘permanent income’ can have when consumers receive both capital and noncapital income.
4Evidence on the actual outcome is diﬃcult to interpret; see Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) for the best
attempt.
2But the only rigorous theoretical underpinning for this view is provided by Deaton
(1991), who examines the problem of a liquidity-constrained consumer whose only un-
certainty comes in the form of permanent shocks to income; Deaton shows that, under
a particular ‘impatience’ condition, such a consumer with zero wealth will exhibit an
MPCP of 1 (because under these assumptions it is always optimal to consume all current
income).
After deriving some new results that bolster Deaton’s conjecture that, in his model,
wealth tends to fall toward the absorbing state of zero where the MPCP is indeed one,
this paper shows that if there are transitory as well as permanent shocks, under realistic
calibrations the optimal MPCP can be substantially (though not enormously) less than
one. The alteration is a consequence of the target-saving behavior that emerges when
consumers are both prudent (Kimball (1990b)) and impatient. For a consumer starting
at the target ratio of assets to permanent income, a positive shock to permanent income
leaves the target unchanged. But for a given level of initial assets, a positive shock to
the level of permanent income reduces the ratio of those assets to permanent income.
For a consumer starting at the target, consumption therefore does not move up by the
full amount of the income shock; the reciprocal logic holds for negative shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. The ﬁrst section sets up the model and notation,
and shows how the requirement of intertemporal budget balance is reﬂected in the
consumption function. The second section derives an expression for the MPCP and
explains qualitatively why it can be diﬀerent from one; it then shows the relationship
between that expression and Deaton’s results, and derives a formula that applies to the
more general model with both transitory and permanent shocks. Because the exact value
of the MPCP cannot be determined except by numerical methods, the fourth section
numerically solves and simulates and ﬁnds that the marginal propensity to consume out
of permanent shocks tends to fall between 0.75 and 0.92 for a wide range of plausible
parameter settings. This section concludes by showing that behavior of the ergodic
population of consumers that arises in the model is very close to behavior of a single
consumer with assets equal to the target value, suggesting that the inconvenient step of
simulation may be unnecessary for many kinds of analysis.
2 The Model
The consumer is assumed to behave according to the limiting solution to the problem
v v vt(m m mt,p p pt) = max
c c ct
Et

T−t 
n=0
β
nu(c c ct+n)

(1)
s.t.
a a at = m m mt −c c ct,
p p pt+1 = p p ptΓψt+1,
m m mt+1 = Ra a at +p p pt+1ξt+1,
3as the horizon T approaches inﬁnity, where for clarity we have separately speciﬁed the
various transitional steps that are often combined when the problem is written in its most
compact (Bellman equation) form: a a at indicates assets after all actions at the end of period
t; R =( 1+r) is the interest factor for assets held between periods; permanent noncapital
income p p pt+1 is equal to its previous value, multiplied by a growth factor Γ, and modiﬁed
by a mean-one shock ψt+1,Et[ψt+1]=1(and we henceforth denote the combination
Γψt+1 compactly by Γt+1);
5 m m mt+1 indicates the level of the consumer’s ‘cash-on-hand’ at
the time the consumption decision is made (the sum of beginning-of-period assets plus
current-period noncapital income, where noncapital income equals permanent noncapital
income p p pt+1 multiplied by a mean-one transitory shock ξt+1,Et[ξt+n]=1∀ n>0,a n d
we henceforth designate total noncapital income by y y yt+1 ≡ p p pt+1ξt+1).
6 As usual, the
recursive nature of the problem allows us to express it more compactly as:
v v vt(m m mt,p p pt) = max
c c ct
u(c c ct)+β Et

v v vt+1(m m mt+1,p p pt+1)

.
As written, the problem has two state variables, the level of permanent income p p pt
and the level of cash-on-hand m m mt. Carroll (2009) shows that if utility is of the Constant
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) form u(c)=c1−ρ/(1 − ρ), it is possible to normalize
the problem by the level of permanent income p p pt, thereby reducing the eﬀective number
of state variables to one. Speciﬁcally, deﬁning nonbold variables as the bold equivalent
divided by permanent noncapital income,
7 mt = m m mt/p p pt, ct = c c ct/p p pt, and so on, and
deﬁning Rt+1 ≡ R/Γt+1, if we solve the problem
vt(mt) = max
ct
u(ct)+β Et[Γ
1−ρ
t+1vt+1(mt+1)] (2)
s.t.
at = mt − ct,
mt+1 = atRt+1 + ξt+1
backwards from a ﬁnal period of life in which vT(m)=u ( m), the full value function
v v vt(m m mt,p p pt) at any prior period t<Tcan be recovered from v v vt(m m mt,p p pt)=p p p
1−ρ
t vt(m m mt/p p pt)
and the consumption function from c c ct(m m mt,p p pt)=c t(m m mt/p p pt)p p pt.
Carroll (2009) proves that the problem deﬁnes a contraction mapping with a limit-
ing consumption function c(m), under certain conditions including a requirement that
the limiting discounted value of optimal behavior is ﬁnite and well-deﬁned, which is
guaranteed by the ‘ﬁnite value condition’ (FVC)
β Et[Γ
1−ρ
t+1] < 1. (3)
The most interesting class of solutions is those that obtain when, in addition to the
FVC, a ‘growth impatience condition’ (GIC) also holds. Deﬁning the GIC requires
5Note that the deﬁnition of permanent income here diﬀers from Deaton (1992)’s deﬁnition (which is often used in the
macro literature), in which permanent income is the amount that a perfect foresight consumer could spend while leaving
total (human and nonhuman) wealth constant.
6This problem is identical to problems that have been analyzed in a number of papers on ‘buﬀer-stock saving’
beginning with Carroll (1992); it diﬀers from the problem analyzed by Deaton (1991) primarily because liquidity
constraints are absent.
7See the appendix for an atlas of the variable names and notational conventions in this paper.
4construction of an uncertainty-adjusted permanent income growth factor
´ Γ=Γ ( Et[ψ
−1
t+1])
−1 (4)
and the speciﬁcation of an ‘absolute patience factor’
Þ Þ Þ =( Rβ)
1/ρ (5)
which measures the growth factor for consumption that would be chosen by the uncon-
strained perfect foresight consumer (the symbol Þ Þ Þ is the Old English letter ‘thorn’).
The GIC can be stated as a requirement that
Þ Þ Þ´ Γ ≡

Þ Þ Þ
´ Γ

< 1 (6)
where we call the scaled version of Þ Þ Þ in (6) the ‘growth patience factor.’
8
Some important conclusions can be drawn simply from the fact that the model can
be rewritten in ratio form. The ﬁrst is that because the level of consumption can
be rewritten as c c ct =c ( mt)p p pt for some invariant c(m), the only way the elasticity of
consumption with respect to permanent income p p pt can be diﬀerent from one is if there
is a correlation between p p pt and mt. Of course, such a correlation does exist: Both p p pt
and mt are inﬂuenced by the realization of the stochastic shock to permanent income
ψt. Furthermore, both will reﬂect residual eﬀects of the previous shocks to permanent
income, ψt−1,ψ t−2,.... It is these eﬀects of the permanent shocks on the cash-on-hand
to permanent-income ratio that will be the key to understanding the results below.
Another important insight comes from the fact, recently proven by Szeidl (2006), that
the distribution of mt is ergodic in models in this class. This implies that eventually
the inﬁnite-horizon MPCP must be one because ergodicity of mt means that the ex-
pectation as of time t of mt+n as n →∞is the same for any particular realizations
of ψt,ψ t−1,ψ t−2,..., implying that as n →∞the time-t expectation of c(mt+n)p p pt+n
depends only on the level of p p pt.
But the ‘marginal propensity to consume’ out of a shock has traditionally been deﬁned
as the immediate eﬀect, not the total eventual eﬀect, and so we now ask how consumption
is aﬀected in period t by the contemporaneous realization of the shock to permanent
income ψt.
3 The Marginal Propensity to Consume Out Of
Permanent Income
As a benchmark, it is useful to begin by deriving the relationship between consumption
and permanent income in the perfect foresight framework.
9
8In fact, the paper shows that the problem deﬁnes a contraction mapping even under a somewhat weaker condition
than the GIC (though the FVC is always required); however, for present purposes the only interesting solutions are those
for which the GIC condition holds, so we impose it as suﬃcient even if not necessary.
9Results would be very similar for the model analyzed by Caballero (1990), with labor income uncertainty but
constant absolute risk aversion utility, or for the certainty equivalent model.
53.1 The Perfect Foresight Case
A standard result in consumption theory
10 is that for the inﬁnite horizon perfect foresight
version of the model above (i.e. a version in which ξt = ψt =1∀ t), the level of
consumption is given by
c c ct =( 1 − R
−1(Rβ)
1/ρ)
	
Ra a at−1 +

p p pt
1 − Γ/R


. (7)
While strictly speaking there is no such thing as a ‘shock’ to permanent income in the
perfect foresight model, it is possible to calculate how consumption would be diﬀerent
if permanent income were diﬀerent. The answer is given by

dc c ct
dp p pt

=

1 − R−1(Rβ)1/ρ
1 − Γ/R

, (8)
which we will refer to henceforth as the MPCP for the perfect foresight model. This
quantity is less than one if
Γ/R < R
−1(Rβ)
1/ρ
Γ < (Rβ)
1/ρ
1 < RβΓ
−ρ.
Notice that for ρ>1 this can hold only if the GIC condition (6) fails (if we capture
the perfect foresight version of the GIC by setting Γt+1 =Γ∀ t). The interpretation is
that in the perfect foresight framework, only the patient consumers have an MPCP of
less than one. This makes intuitive sense: Patient consumers prefer to consume more in
the future than in the present, so they do not spend all of the increase in income today.
Although this perfect foresight framework is often presented as the formalization of
Friedman (1957)’s Permanent Income Hypothesis, the model implies that consumption
responds one-for-one to a change in permanent noncapital income p p pt only if (Rβ)1/ρ =Γ .
For plausible parameter values the model can easily predict an MPCP of anywhere
between 0 and 6 (see table 1 for a paramterization that implies an MPCP of 6).
This observation casts doubt upon the proposition that it is appropriate to treat the
perfect foresight model as a formalization of Friedman (1957). For an argument that the
buﬀer-stock model (that is, the solution to the model described above with impatient
but prudent consumers) is a much better match than the perfect foresight model to
Friedman’s original description of the PIH, see Carroll (2001).
3.2 The Response to Permanent Income Shocks
The natural deﬁnition of the MPCP in a model with shocks is the derivative of c c ct+1 with
respect to ψt+1, given an initial level of assets a a at = atp p pt,
dc c ct+1
dψt+1
=
dp p pt+1c(mt+1)
dψt+1
10For a derivation, see, e.g., the graduate lecture notes on the author’s home page,
http://econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/public/lecturenotes.
6= p p ptΓ

d(ψt+1c(Rt+1at + ξt+1))
dψt+1

.
This equation reveals a minor conceptual diﬃculty: The eﬀect of ψt+1 on c c ct+1 depends
not only on the value of at but also on the realization of ξt+1, and so in principle there
are two ‘state variables’ (other than the scaling variable ˆ p p pt+1 ≡ Γp p pt) that determine the
ex post MPCP. However, since ξt+1 is an i.i.d. random variable, it is easy and intuitive
to calculate the expectation of the derivative as
Et
	
d
dψt+1
ˆ p p pt+1ψt+1ct+1


= ˆ p p pt+1 Et
	
ψt+1
dc(mt+1)
dψt+1
+c ( mt+1)


= ˆ p p pt+1 Et
	
ψt+1c
 (mt+1)
dmt+1
dψt+1
+c ( mt+1)


= ˆ p p pt+1 Et
	
ψt+1c
 (mt+1)
d
dψt+1
(Rt+1at + ξt+1)+c ( mt+1)


= ˆ p p pt+1 Et [c(mt+1) − c
 (mt+1)Rt+1at], (9)
where the last line follows because Rt+1 =( R/Γ)ψ
−1
t+1 and ψ(d/dψ)ψ−1 = −ψψ−2 =
−ψ−1. This expression leads to the natural deﬁnition of the MPCP, π(at),a st h e
expression multiplying the expected level of permanent income ˆ p p pt+1,
π(at) ≡ Et [c(mt+1) − c
 (mt+1)Rt+1at]. (10)
3.3 The Deaton Case (Permanent Shocks Only)
This expression maps nicely into Deaton (1991)’s ﬁnding that for consumers who begin
with zero market resources the marginal propensity to consume out of p p pt+1 is one. Such
consumers have at =0and therefore the second term on the RHS in equation (9) drops
out. Deaton also assumed that there were no transitory shocks to income, so that
ξt+1 =1 . Finally, his consumers were suﬃciently impatient so that their consumption
at c(m) was equal to one at m =1 . Hence the MPCP was given by π(0) = Et[c(1)] = 1.
To really understand Deaton’s result, it is necessary to recall why it must be that
c(1) = 1.
11 Consider the ﬁrst order condition for the unconstrained optimization prob-
lem,
c(mt)
−ρ = Rβ Et[Γ
−ρ
t+1c(mt+1)
−ρ].
The consumer will be constrained at mt =1iﬀ the marginal utility of consuming 1
(which is 1−ρ =1 ) is greater than the marginal utility of saving at =0 , i.e. if
1 > Rβ Et[Γ
−ρ
t+1c((Rt+1) × 0+1 )
−ρ]
1 > Rβ Et[Γ
−ρ
t+1] (11)
where the second line follows from the ﬁrst because with at =0 , mt+1 = ξt+1 =1=mt.
Deaton directly imposes condition (11), thus guaranteeing his result that a consumer
11The following is intended as a loose intuitive argument rather than a rigorous derivation; in particular it mixes logic
from the constrained and unconstrained optimization problems. See Deaton (1991) for the rigorous version.
7with zero a who experiences only permanent shocks will remain at zero a forever. Zero
a is an absorbing state.
12
What Deaton was unable to prove, but conjectured must be true, was that a liquidity-
constrained consumer who starts with positive a will always eventually run down that
a to reach the absorbing state of a =0 . Consider the accumulation equation for m,
at+1 = Rt+1at +1− c(Rt+1at +1 ) . (12)
Carroll and Kimball (2005) show that the marginal propensity to consume out of
transitory income in a problem with liquidity constraints is always greater than the
MPC in the unconstrained case. We also know, from combining Kimball (1990a)a n d
Carroll and Kimball (1996), that the MPC in the unconstrained case with noncapital
income risk is greater than the MPC without noncapital income risk. But from (7)w e
know that the MPC in the unconstrained case with no uncertainty is
κ ≡ (1 − R
−1(Rβ)
1/ρ), (13)
and so the Carroll and Kimball (1996) results tell us that
c(1 + Rt+1at) > c(1) + Rt+1atκ =1+Rt+1atκ
where the equality holds because c(1) = 1. Substituting in equation (12),
at+1 < Rt+1at − κRt+1at
< Rt+1at(1 − κ). (14)
From this we have (substituting (13)i n t o( 14))
at+1 < Rt+1atR
−1(Rβ)
1/ρ = at(Rβ)
1/ρ/Γt+1. (15)
But for ρ>1, Jensen’s inequality implies that Deaton’s impatience condition (11)i s
stronger than the GIC imposed in (6),
13 which is that the expectation of the expression
multiplying at on the RHS of equation (15) is less than one, so that
Et[at+1] <a t.
Thus, at any positive level of assets at > 0, assets are expected to fall toward zero.
Note that this condition does not guarantee that assets ever reach zero in ﬁnite time,
because in principle it is possible (though arbitrarily improbable) to draw an arbitrarily
long sequence of low draws of ψt. On the other hand, equation (15)d o e sr u l eo u tt h e
possibility that Deaton raised (but doubted) that some positive level of assets a could
exist such that if at >athe consumption rule might never allow assets to fall below a,
thus preventing the consumer from ever reaching the absorbing state of at =0 . Hence,
in Deaton’s model, a falls unboundedly toward zero, and if it ever reaches zero, the
MPCP equals one ever after.
12Note that Deaton’s condition is stronger than the one required for the problem to deﬁne a contraction mapping.
This reﬂects a subtle distinction: If the weaker condition (6) is imposed, but Deaton’s stronger condition (11)i sn o t
satisﬁed, then a consumer who begins the period with zero resources will choose to save some strictly positive amount.
In this case, zero wealth is NOT an absorbing state, and the target asset-to-permanent-income ratio is actually positive.
13Because Et[Γ
−ρ
t+1]1/ρ ≥ Et[Γ−1
t+1]−1.
83.4 The General Case (Transitory and Permanent Shocks)
Carroll (2009) proves that a ‘target’ value of ˇ a will exist, where the target is deﬁned as
the level of assets such that Et[at+1]=at. Consider the behavior of consumption around
the target,
at+1 = Rt+1at + ξt+1 − c(Rt+1at + ξt+1)
Et[at+1]=Et[Rt+1]at +1− Et [c(Rt+1at + ξt+1)]
ˇ a =ˇ aEt[Rt+1]+1− Et [c(Rt+1ˇ a + ξt+1)]
Et [c(Rt+1ˇ a + ξt+1) ] = 1+( Et[Rt+1] − 1)ˇ a. (16)
With this observation about the nature of the target, we are now in position to walk
through the key result of the paper. At at =ˇ a, from (10) the deﬁnition of the MPCP is
π(ˇ a)=Et [c(Rt+1ˇ a + ξt+1)] − Et [c
 (Rt+1ˇ a + ξt+1)Rt+1)ˇ a]
=1 + ( ( Et[Rt+1] − 1) − Et[c
 (Rt+1ˇ a + ξt+1)Rt+1])ˇ a
so that if ˇ a>0 (which will be shown below), it is clear that the MPCP will be less than
one if
0 > ((Et[Rt+1] − 1) − Et[c
 (Rt+1ˇ a + ξt+1)Rt+1]). (17)
Before we prove that this condition holds, consider what it means in intuitive terms.
Since R, Γ and ψ are all numbers close to one, the latter term will be very close to
the expected marginal propensity to consume Et[c 
t+1(mt+1)]. The former term is the
intrinsic geometric growth rate of the assets/permanent-labor-income ratio (intrinsic,
in the sense that it reﬂects both the return on assets R and the dilution of assets by
permanent income growth and shocks, 1/Γt+1). So this condition boils down to whether
the MPC out of transitory income is greater than the intrinsic growth of a. But that is
fundamentally what the impatience condition is about: If consumers are impatient, they
will want to spend more than the amount justiﬁed by intrinsic growth of a. Thus, the
assumption of impatience ensures an MPC out of transitory income that is large enough
to overcome the intrinsic growth of a.
The key question therefore is whether we know the MPC out of transitory income
is large enough. But recall that Carroll and Kimball (1996) have shown that the
marginal propensity to consume under uncertainty is strictly greater than the MPC
in the corresponding perfect certainty model, which turns out to be precisely the lower
bound we need. That is, we know that c (mt+1) >κwhere as above κ =1−R−1(Rβ)1/ρ
is the MPC in the perfect foresight inﬁnite horizon case. Using this fact gives
Et[c
 (mt+1)Rt+1] >κ Et[Rt+1]
so (17) will certainly hold if the weaker condition
0 > (Et[Rt+1] − 1) − Et[Rt+1]κ
1 > Et[(Rβ)
1/ρ/Γt+1]
holds. But this is just the GIC imposed above. Hence, at the target a the MPCP is
strictly less than one.
9Thus, the bottom line is that the growth impatience condition (6) guarantees a
marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income that is large enough that, at the
target ˇ a, the reduction in a induced by the permanent income shock cuts consumption
by more than the amount that consumption increases as a result of the higher permanent
income.
T h eﬁ n a ll o o s ee n di st os h o wt h a tˇ a>0. However, a result long-established in this
literature is that with a CRRA utility function and no liquidity constraints, the lower
bound on assets is the present discounted value of the minimum possible realization of
future labor income. With lognormal permanent income shocks with no lower bound (as
assumed here), the lower bound on future labor income is zero, so assets will always be
strictly greater than zero. With actual assets always strictly positive, the target a must
be positive if it exists.
14
A brief discussion of how the results would be modiﬁed in the presence of liquidity
constraints is in order. The ﬁrst point to note is that for the model exactly as presented
above, the addition of constraints would have no eﬀect on behavior, because the con-
sumer voluntarily chooses never to borrow even if constraints are not present. However,
if lower bounds are placed on the transitory and permanent shocks, then consumers will
wish to borrow in some circumstances. In this case constraints can make a diﬀerence.
Carroll and Kimball (2005) provide a rigorous analysis of the eﬀects of constraints on
the decision rule, and it is clear from that analysis that a comprehensive and rigorous
analysis of the eﬀects of constraints here would be very complex. But intuition provides
a clear bottom line. In the case with constraints, the minimum value of a is zero. It
is also possible that the target ˇ a is zero. But there will generally be some consumers
who in some circustances will hold positive assets. For these consumers, the logic above
should hold, so that the MPCP is less than one. Simulation analysis of the model with
constraints presented in Carroll (2001) conﬁrms these intuitions.
We can also say something about how π(at) varies with the level of assets. Its
derivative with respect to assets is given by

d
dat

π(at)=Et

c
 (mt+1)Rt+1 − c
 (mt+1)Rt+1 − c
  (mt+1)R
2
t+1

= Et[−c
  (mt+1)R
2
t+1]. (18)
But Carroll and Kimball (1996) prove that for problems in the class considered here the
consumption function is strictly concave, c  (m) < 0, and since R2
t+1 is certainly positive,
equation (18) implies that the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent shocks
is increasing in the level of assets.
Indeed, we can even show that for a large enough level of actual assets, the MPCP
will rise above one. This is because as the ratio of actual assets to permanent income
approaches inﬁnity, behavior in the model becomes arbitrarily close to behavior in the
perfect foresight model. (For a proof, see Carroll and Kimball (2005)). Equation (8)
implies that if the impatience condition is satisﬁed, the MPCP for the perfect foresight
14For a proof that a target ratio exists, see Carroll (2009); a positive value of the target is also an implication of the
results in Szeidl (2006), who shows that the support of the distribution of a is strictly positive, and the target must be
inside the support of the distribution.
10model is greater than one, so the limit of the MPCP for the buﬀer-stock model as assets
approaches inﬁnity must exceed one. Note, however, the peculiar nature of the thought
experiment here: The impatience condition is precisely what prevents assets from rising
to inﬁnity, so the question of what happens to the MPCP as we mechanically move
assets toward inﬁnity despite the fact that they are predicted to fall, is very much a
curiosum.
These results appear to be the most that can be said analytically about the charac-
teristics of π(at). To obtain quantitative results for the average behavior of a population
of consumers it is necessary to simulate.
4 Simulation Results
Table 1 presents simulation results for the average value of π (labelled “Mean π”)
that arises in steady-state among a population of consumers all behaving according
to the model outlined above, under a baseline set of parameter values and a variety of
alternatives.
The baseline calibration of the income process is taken from Carroll (1992), who ﬁnds
that household-level data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics are reasonably
well characterized by the assumption that ψt is lognormally distributed with standard
deviation σψ =0 .10, while the process for transitory income has two parts: With
probability ℘, income is zero, and with probability (1 − ℘) the transitory shock θt is
equal to 1/(1−℘) times the value of a shock drawn from a lognormal distribution with
standard deviation σθ =0 .10 and mean value one, so that Et[ξt+1]=1as assumed above.
Permanent noncapital income growth at the household level is assumed to be Γ=1 .03.
The baseline calibration for the interest rate and time preference rate are commonly-used
values in macroeconomics, R =1 .04, β =0 .96. The baseline coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion is ρ =3 , in the middle of the range from 1 to 5 generally considered plausible.
The ﬁrst row of the table presents results for the baseline parameter values. The main
result is found in the column labelled “Mean π.” To be perfectly clear about what this
object is, assume a population of mass 1 is distributed uniformly on the unit interval,
and deﬁne the operator M which calculates the mean value of variables in a population
whose members are indexed by i; thus, “Mean π”i s
M[π(at,i)] =
 1
0
Et,i[c(mt+1,i) − c
 (mt+1,i)Rt+1,iat,i]di, (19)
where the mean is calculated in a period t in which the distribution has converged to
the invariant distribution whose existence is proven by Szeidl.
For comparison, the table also presents, where applicable,
15 the MPCP implied by
the perfect foresight inﬁnite horizon version of the model (labelled “Π∞”), and from a
perfect foresight model for a consumer of average age (45) who has a horizon of 40 years
15For the inﬁnite horizon MPCP to exist, the condition R > Γ must hold, but this condition is not required to solve
the stochastic model.
11(twenty years of work and twenty years of retirement), labelled “ΠT−40.”
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Under the baseline parameter values, the population-average value of π is about 0.79.
As the remainder of the table shows, the population-average value of π is between about
0.75 and 0.92 for most parametric conﬁgurations.
In addition to π, the table presents population-average values of each of the terms
that made up π from (10).
Recall that at the target level of ˇ a equation (16)t e l l su st h a t
Et [c(mt+1) ] = 1+( Et[Rt+1] − 1)ˇ a.
Since Et[Rt+1] will generally be a number close to one, this ﬁrst term in the π(a)
expression could be substantially diﬀerent from one only if consumers ended up holding
large values of a. But since they are impatient by assumption, they are not likely to
end up with large values of a. This reasoning is conﬁrmed by the column of the table
labelled “Mean c,” which ﬁnds values very close to 1 for all parametric combinations.
Thus, most of the variation in the average value of π across parametric choices is
attributable to diﬀerences in the −at Et[c (mt+1)Rt+1] term. Making consumers more
patient has two eﬀects on this term. On the one hand, it increases target assets ˇ a and
therefore average assets, which makes the term more negative, reducing π; on the other
hand, the MPC c  declines with the level of assets, which would tend to shrink the term
and therefore increase π. The near-constancy of population-mean π indicates that these
two eﬀects are roughly oﬀsetting across diﬀerent parametric choices.
The relative stability of π for the buﬀer-stock model contrasts sharply with the MPCP
for the inﬁnite horizon perfect foresight model, for which the MPCP is always greater
than 1.8 in the ﬁrst panel of the table, and rises as high as 6.2. The reason the
MPCP in the PF model is always greater than one is that our consumers all satisfy
the impatience criterion; inspection of (8) will verify that the MPCP must be greater
than one if the impatience criterion is satisﬁed. This makes sense; impatient perfect-
foresight consumers, upon learning that their income will be higher forever, will tend to
increase their consumption by more than the increase in current income. However, what
may not have been obvious ex ante is how much greater than 1 the MPCP typically is
in the PF model. Results for the ﬁnite-horizon perfect foresight model are less extreme
than for the inﬁnite horizon version, but even in the ﬁnite-horizon model the MPCP is
always at least 1.2 in the upper panel of the table.
The last three rows of the table present results when the permanent shocks are shut
down and income growth is reduced; the most important result is for the case where
there is no growth at all in income, so that (Rβ)1/ρ ≈ Γ, which, as noted earlier, is the
condition that guarantees an MPCP of 1 in the perfect foresight model (the actual pefect
foresight MPCP reported in the table is slightly above 1 because Rβ is slightly below 1
for the baseline values (R,β)=( 1 .04,0.96)). In the absence of permanent shocks, the
impatience condition is (barely) satisﬁed and the stochastic version of the model can be
solved with transitory shocks, generating an average π of about 0.88.
16The assumption is that upon retirement, total noncapital income (including Social Security and pension income)
drops permanently to about 70 percent of preretirement salary, a calibration that roughly matches empirical evidence for
the U.S.
12The remaining two rows show the consequences when the expected growth rate of
income rises to 1 percent and 2 percent: The PF MPCP increases sharply, to slightly
over 2 when Γ=1 .02; in the ﬁnite-horizion PF model, the MPCP rises to slightly
over 1.2. In contrast, π falls to about 0.79 in the stochastic version of the model. This
experiment highlights the interesting point that the relationship between impatience and
the MPCP is of opposite sign in the stochastic and nonstochastic versions of the model.
The principal message from the table is that if consumers are impatient but prudent,
optimal behavior implies an immediate MPC out of permanent shocks that is somewhat
less than one (but not enormously less) for a wide variety of parameter values. More
broadly, the value of the MPCP is much less sensitive to parameter values in the
stochastic version of the model than in the perfect foresight version. And of course,
the MPCP would be even lower for a ﬁnite horizon version of the stochastic model (just
as in the perfect foresight model), because over a ﬁnite horizon a “permanent” shock has
less eﬀect on future resources than in an inﬁnite horizon model.
A ﬁnal point deserves elaboration. The theoretical results derived in section 3 applied
only at the target level of assets. Yet table 1 shows that the conclusions reached for
the target level of assets hold for populations distributed according to the invariant
distributions. Since constructing the invariant distributions requires considerable extra
work, it would be worthwhile to see whether results at exactly the target levels of assets
are a good proxy for results from the invariant populations.
Table 2 presents the main statistics of interest, calculated both as an average across
consumers distributed according to the invariant distribution, and for a consumer exactly
at the target value of m or a (depending on the argument of the function). The
message is simple: The target values are always very close to the population-average
values. This suggests that theoretical work along the lines of that conducted in section 3
is likely to be both qualitatively and quantitatively a good guide to the behavior of
an entire population. Since more propositions can be proven for the target level of
assets than for the behavior of the ergodic population, and since it is possible to obtain
quantitative results for the target values of a model without simulating, this suggests
that future theoretical and quantitative work with this model may be able to dispense
with simulation altogether, considerably reducing the computational demands of working
with this class of models.
5 Conclusion
Intuition suggests that rational forward-looking consumers should have a marginal
propensity to consume of one out of permanent shocks. This paper shows that while
this intuition is not correct, or even close to correct, for the canonical inﬁnite horizion
perfect-foresight version of the CRRA-utility optimization model, it is approximately
right for the ‘buﬀer-stock’ version of the model that arises when consumers are impatient
and have a standard precautionary saving motive. The reason the MPCP is somewhat
less than one in the buﬀer-stock model is that an increase in permanent income reduces
the ratio of assets to permanent income, thus (temporarily) increasing the amount of
13precautionary saving. Simulations show that across a wide range of assumptions about
the degree of impatience, the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent shocks
is generally in or near the range from 0.75 to about 0.92.
The results in this paper are important for three reasons. First, empirical evidence
from household surveys indicates that households experience large permanent shocks to
their incomes of precisely the kind studied here, and no existing paper has provided
a general theoretical analysis of the eﬀects of these kinds of shocks on consumption.
Second, the sharp contrast between the results for the stochastic and nonstochastic
models, and the fact that the results for the stochastic model are much more plausible,
provides another reason (if any were needed) that economists should avoid using the
perfect foresight model for quantitative analysis. Finally, the paper provides a formal
justiﬁcation (that many economists probably did not know was lacking in the perfect
foresight framework) for the assertion that permanent increases or decreases in taxes
should result in consumption responses of roughly the same size, though the scrupulous
economic advisor should warn that the response should be slightly less than one-for-one
in the short run.
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17A Appendix
The following tables are provided to aid the reader in keeping track of nonstandard
elements of the paper’s notation.
Parameter Deﬁnition
R Riskfree Interest Factor
Γ Nonstochastic Part of Permanent Noncapital Income Growth
ψ Permanent Shock to Income
ξ Transitory Shock to Income
θ Transitory Shock to Income, Conditional On Nonzero Income
ρ Coeﬃcient of Relative Risk Aversion
Some combinations of the parameters above are used as convenient shorthand:
Symbol Deﬁnition
Γt+1 ≡ Γψt+1 Growth Factor for Permanent Noncapital Income
´ Γ ≡ Γ(Et[ψ
−1
t+1])−1 Uncertainty-adjusted Growth Factor
Rt+1 ≡ R/Γt+1 Return Normalized By Growth
Þ Þ Þ´ Γ ≡
(βR)1/ρ
´ Γ Growth Patience Factor
Endogenous variables:
Variable Deﬁnition
a Assets After All Actions (at end of period)
b Beginning Bank Balances Before Consumption Choice
c Consumption
m Market Resources (Sum of Bank Balances and Income)
The meaning of typographical accents:
Accent Meaning
Bold Level of a Variable
Plain Ratio of The Variable To Permanent Labor Income
∨ ˇ • is the target value of variable •
Abbreviations:
Acronym Meaning Deﬁnition
FVC Finite Value Condition β Et[Γ
1−ρ
t+1] < 1
GIC Growth Impatience Condition Þ Þ Þ´ Γ < 1
18Deviations Patience Mean Mean Mean Mean Perfect Foresight
from Baseline‡ Þ Þ Þ´ Γ c a κ π Π∞ ΠT−40
None (baseline) 0.980 1.012 0.619 0.236 0.783 4.053 1.632
β =0 .98 0.987 1.016 0.800 0.163 0.787 3.364 1.474
β =0 .90 0.959 1.009 0.440 0.370 0.792 6.181 2.168
R =1 .02 0.974 1.000 0.545 0.277 0.781 -  1.958
R =1 .06 0.986 1.030 0.769 0.181 0.790 1.806 1.405
Γ=1 .02 0.990 1.030 1.002 0.125 0.803 2.027 1.375
Γ=1 .04 0.971 1.005 0.514 0.302 0.784 -  1.958
ρ =1 0.979 1.005 0.230 0.320 0.913 4.160 1.657
ρ =4 0.980 1.017 0.837 0.201 0.731 4.040 1.629
σψ =0 .05 0.973 1.006 0.496 0.316 0.785 4.053 1.632
σψ =0 .12 0.984 1.020 0.832 0.160 0.791 4.053 1.632
℘ =0 .0005 0.980 1.006 0.329 0.288 0.871 4.053 1.632
℘ =0 .05 0.980 1.028 1.388 0.177 0.658 4.053 1.632
σθ =0 .05 0.980 1.012 0.581 0.240 0.787 4.053 1.632
σθ =0 .15 0.980 1.014 0.680 0.229 0.777 4.053 1.632
σψ=0, Γ = 1.00 0.999 1.069 1.729 0.062 0.882 1.013 1.008
σψ=0, Γ = 1.01 0.990 1.020 0.667 0.211 0.783 1.351 1.171
σψ=0, Γ = 1.02 0.980 1.010 0.538 0.283 0.784 2.027 1.375
‡ The ﬁrst column indicates parameters that diﬀer from the baseline. The baseline values are R =1 .04,β=0 .96,Γ=
1.03,ρ=3 ,σ ψ =0 .1,σ θ =0 .1,℘=0 .005. The ﬁrst row presents results when all parameters are at their baseline
values.
 The inﬁnite horizon perfect foresight solution is not well deﬁned for these conﬁgurations of parameter values
because R ≤ Γ.
Þ Þ Þ´ Γ is the value of the growth patience factor deﬁned in equation (6).
Table 1 Simulated Population-Mean MPCP π and Other Statistics
19Assets a MPC κ MPCP π
Deviations‡ Þ Þ Þ´ Γ Mean Target Mean Target Mean Target
None (baseline) 0.980 0.619 0.600 0.236 0.230 0.783 0.782
β =0 .98 0.987 0.800 0.761 0.163 0.157 0.787 0.781
β =0 .90 0.959 0.440 0.433 0.370 0.368 0.792 0.792
R =1 .02 0.974 0.545 0.533 0.277 0.272 0.781 0.780
R =1 .06 0.986 0.769 0.730 0.181 0.175 0.790 0.785
Γ=1 .02 0.990 1.002 0.921 0.125 0.116 0.803 0.789
Γ=1 .04 0.971 0.514 0.504 0.302 0.298 0.784 0.784
ρ =1 0.979 0.230 0.219 0.320 0.308 0.913 0.913
ρ =4 0.980 0.837 0.808 0.201 0.195 0.731 0.727
σψ =0 .05 0.973 0.496 0.487 0.316 0.312 0.785 0.785
σψ =0 .12 0.984 0.832 0.781 0.160 0.151 0.791 0.783
℘ =0 .0005 0.980 0.329 0.303 0.288 0.278 0.871 0.870
℘ =0 .05 0.980 1.388 1.382 0.177 0.174 0.658 0.654
σθ =0 .05 0.980 0.581 0.571 0.240 0.238 0.787 0.787
σθ =0 .15 0.980 0.680 0.647 0.229 0.219 0.777 0.774
σψ=0, Γ = 1.00 0.999 1.729 1.456 0.062 0.060 0.882 0.854
σψ=0, Γ = 1.01 0.990 0.667 0.650 0.211 0.206 0.783 0.782
σψ=0, Γ = 1.02 0.980 0.538 0.528 0.283 0.279 0.784 0.784
‡ This column indicates parameters that diﬀer from the baseline. The baseline values are
R =1 .04,β =0 .96,Γ=1 .03,ρ =3 ,σ ψ =0 .1,σ θ =0 .1,℘ =0 .005. The ﬁrst row presents results when
all parameters are at their baseline values.
 The inﬁnite horizon perfect foresight solution is not well deﬁned for these conﬁgurations of parameter values
because R ≤ Γ.
Þ Þ Þ´ Γ is the value of the growth patience factor deﬁned in equation (6).
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